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The Determinants of Party Consensus 




This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the process of po-
litical competition during the European integration process in Montenegro. 
While unanimously endorsing the process of its EU accession, political par-
ties in the country are at odds with each other regarding almost all other issues 
of substantial importance for its past and future, including Montenegro’s state 
independence. This article intends to show what is in the European Union that 
brings divided Montenegrin political parties together, and asks if it is the EU 
at all?
The article argues that because of the late political transition resulting from 
the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the main determinants of 
party contestation on EU integration in Montenegro differ from those in most 
Western and East/Central European countries. The article demonstrates that 
neither the ideological profile of Montenegrin political parties nor the EU’s 
leverage on the country’s political elite during the transition period can serve 
as adequate explanations of this process. Instead, it posits that embracing the 
pro-EU stance was the easiest and arguably the most effective way for the par-
ties under observation to establish some discontinuity with their Milošević-
era shady political past, providing them with a new source of the previously 
lost political legitimacy.
Keywords: Party Competition, EU Integration, Montenegro, Independence, 
Political Transition
1. Introduction
It is often said that a picture is worth a thousand words. The campaign for the 2006 
referendum on independence in Montenegro strongly confirmed the old proverb. 
The turn of the century brought about a clear division among political parties and 
citizens of this former Yugoslav republic over the issue of its statehood. Other po-
litical differences aside, they first and foremost represented either supporters or 
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opponents of Montenegrin sovereignty. The plebiscite was to finally clarify which 
of the two ideas, independence, represented by the Movement for Independent 
Montenegro, or union, represented by the Movement for the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro, had a majority support.
At the two political camps’ campaign rallies, either Montenegrin or the three-
colored flag of the Serb-Montenegrin state federation were proudly waving. At the 
same time, the twelve star-banner of the European Union was present at all the gathe-
rings. In addition, the parliamentary and presidential elections held in the after-
math of the referendum were marked by the same political symbolism. Once again, 
among considerably different political messages conveyed to the electorate by vari-
ous political parties, one was common to all of them: the necessity of Montenegro’s 
accession to the EU.
How is it possible, one could ask, that in a country that lacks internal political 
consensus on the most fundamental question of statehood, the party organizations 
are unanimous in support of the country’s European integration? Or, to put it dif-
ferently, what are the determinants of their positive attitude towards the accession 
process? 
To date, two dominant theoretical approaches seem to have been developed 
to address the issue of domestic political competition on the issue of European in-
tegration. Focusing on the countries of Western and East/Central Europe, the first 
approach explains the process of EU accession on the basis of the ideological affili-
ation of the observed parties. Dealing primarily with East/Central Europe’s new de-
mocracies, the second approach identifies as the key determinant of this process the 
EU’s leverage on these countries’ political elites during the period of post-commu-
nist transition. Despite these theories’ valuable contribution to a better understand-
ing of the phenomenon of domestic political contestation on the issue of European 
integration, we argue that they offer an insufficient explanation for the case of Mon-
tenegro and party consensus surrounding the issue of EU integration.
As a consequence of the political crisis that followed the process of disinte-
gration of the former Yugoslavia, genuine political transition in Montenegro began 
nearly a decade after the collapse of communism. The effect of the country’s late 
transition on the domestic political competition was twofold. First, the process of 
political parties’ ideological framing was overshadowed by ethnic politics and thus 
effectively hindered. Consequently, in Montenegro, like in most countries of the 
Western Balkan region, there are still no “firm links between the ideological posi-
tions of voters or political parties, on the one hand, and social structures or basic 
values on the other” (Marks et al., 2006: 158). Secondly, the level of influence of 
the European Union on the development of party competition in Montenegro – then 
a member state of Slobodan Milošević’s internationally isolated Federal Republic 
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of Yugoslavia (Savezna Republika Jugoslavija – SRJ) – was exceptionally low 
throughout the 1990s during which Montenegrin political parties first defined their 
policies on European integration. The process of party positioning on the issue of 
Montenegro’s EU accession had therefore been largely completed before the actual 
integration process began. 
For these reasons, I argue that one needs to revisit the period of Montenegro’s 
post-communist transition and identify the critical junctures of this process in order 
to understand the determinants of today’s political competition on the issue of Eu-
ropean integration. 
This article is structured as follows. First, the two aforementioned theoretical 
approaches to the issue of party positioning in relation to the EU are further elabo-
rated. The related puzzling Montenegrin experience is subsequently analyzed and 
accounted for against the assumptions of these approaches. Finally, an original ar-
gument about the determinants of party competition on the issue of European inte-
gration in Montenegro is presented.
2. Party Competition on the Issue of European Integration: 
    Theoretical Perspectives
Over the last quarter century, the European Union expanded both functionally and 
geographically. Due to an accelerated structural development and the ensuing en-
largement of its powers, the EU entered virtually every aspect of political life of its 
member states. Once seen as a matter of inter-state political relations, the process of 
European integration became a new reality of political relations within these coun-
tries. As noted by Steenbergen and Marks, “in the era following the Single Euro-
pean Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has been transformed into 
a multi-level polity in which European issues have become important not only for 
national governments, but also for citizens, political parties, interest groups, and 
social movements” (2004: 1). The attitudes of voters and political parties towards 
these issues thus emerged as an important determinant of the domestic-level politi-
cal game.1
In addition, within less than a decade, the number of European Union mem-
ber states nearly doubled. Apart from the smallest Malta and Cyprus, the EU’s new 
members are all situated in East/Central Europe and had, throughout the post-WWII 
period, represented one-party socialist regimes. In the years that followed the col-
lapse of communism, they defined EU membership as the key foreign policy goal. 
“Shortly after the revolutions of 1989”, Kopecky and Mudde write, “the idea of 
1 For more on the issue of politicization of European integration, see: De Wilde (2011), Green-
Pedersen (2012), and the 2016 special issue (vol. 39, no. 1) of West European Politics.
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‘Europe’ became an all-embracing concept which united the political elites and 
masses in their burning desire to join the EU” (2002: 98). In effect, East/Central 
European states marked the course of future political development and created the 
structural framework for party contestation. The political dynamics in the countries 
of this region have to a great extent been influenced by the issues related to the pro-
cess of European integration.
The intense transformation of the European Union throughout the last twenty 
five years has attracted considerable academic attention. In this regard, the effects 
of the process of European integration on domestic political competition and, in 
particular, the positioning of political parties on issues related to this process have 
been studied extensively by numerous scholars. A variety of their answers to the ba-
sic question on “how is the conflict over integration structured” (Steenbergen and 
Marks, 2004: 1) may, depending on the observed region, be grouped within two 
theoretical approaches. 
2.1. Ideological Affiliation of Political Parties
The first approach analyzes the way in which political parties in Western and East/
Central European states position themselves vis-à-vis European integration. Al-
though some explain this process by factors such as the strategic contest of parties, 
their participation in government, or the position of their supporters, the majority of 
scholars regard ideological location in domestic political competition as the most 
reliable indicator of party attitude towards EU integration (Aspinwall, 2002; Ko-
pecky and Mudde, 2002; Hooghe et al., 2002; Gabel and Hix, 2002; Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2004; Whitefield et al., 2007).2 To define this location, they usually 
employ the two-dimensional model of political space composed of economic (Left-
Right) and cultural (GAL-TAN) elements,3 in which they place a party in question. 
Using this model, scholars have been able to comparatively examine party position-
ing on European integration in the two aforementioned regions.4
And while identifying different structures of party competition in Western and 
East/Central European states, they came to the conclusion that the logic underlying 
this process was the same across the two regions (see Figure 1 on the next page). 
Thus, “in the West, where the status quo is capitalism, there is an affinity between 
2 The basic idea behind this approach is comprised in the following statement by Marks et al.: 
“although European integration is a new issue on the political agenda, parties strive to encapsu-
late it within their established ideologies” (2002: 586).
3 Green-Alternative-Liberal vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist. Similarly, in an earlier at-
tempt to structure it along the lines of ideological affiliation, Kitschelt (1994) identifies two di-
mensions of political competition space: socialist vs. capitalist and libertarian vs. authoritarian.
4 See, for instance: Rovny and Edwards (2012).
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the pro-market Right and [...] TAN values and between the Left, which favors po-
litical regulation, and libertarian or GAL values” (Marks et al., 2006: 160). At the 
same time, this ideological axis of party competition in Western Europe stands or-
thogonally to that in East/Central European countries where “defenders of non-
market distribution are TAN and those anticipating benefits from marketization are 
GAL” (ibid.). As a result, while Euro skepticism is found to be “prevalent among 
radical Left parties and among radical TAN parties” in both regions, radical Left 
and radical TAN tend to combine in the same parties in East/Central Europe, which 
is not the case in the West (ibid.: 167).5
Building upon their work, Vachudova and Hooghe also argue that a “single 
logic accounts for party positioning on EU integration across the East and the West” 
even though its outcome could not differ more owing to the diverging histories of 
political party development in the two regions (2009: 180). They demonstrate that 
in Western European politics an opposition to European integration is bundled at 
the extremes of the ideological space. At the same time, the opponents of European 
integration in East/Central Europe converge to the Left-TAN corner while the sup-
5 The results of the most recent Chapel Hill expert survey underlying such analyses are present-
ed in: Bakker et al. (2015).
Figure 1. Dimensions of Party Competition in Western and East/Central Europe
Source: Marks et al. (2006)
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port for this process comes from the opposite ideological pole (see Figure 2), which 
the authors regard as a consequence of East/Central European states’ experience of 
the unraveling of the communist system in the process of economic and political 
transformation (ibid.: 188).
The main findings of these analyses may be summarized in the claim that in 
both old and new EU member states, ideological position in domestic political com-
petition determines parties’ attitude toward the European integration process. As 
noted by Kopecky and Mudde, “there are good grounds to argue that ideology is the 
crucial factor in explaining the positions that political parties adopt on issues sur-
rounding the current process of European integration” (2002: 321). In the case of 
East/Central European states, this argument is mediated by political parties’ specific 
Figure 2. Party Competition on European Integration in Western 
and East/Central Europe
 
Source: Vachudova and Hooghe (2009); ‘Irecon’ represents the economic (Left-Right) ideologi-
cal dimension
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historical experience. Therefore, notwithstanding the same logic of party position-
ing on European integration, the result of this process in the two observed regions 
is completely different.
2.2. The EU Political Leverage 
The second approach to the problem of domestic political competition on EU in-
tegration focuses on the way political elites in the countries of East/Central Eu-
rope position themselves vis-à-vis this process. It considers the leverage of EU en-
largement on potential candidate countries in the region to be the main determinant 
of the elites’ attitudes (Schimmelfennig, 2000; 2001; 2003; 2007; Jacoby, 2001; 
Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Moravscik and Vachudova, 2003; Grzymala-Busse 
and Innes, 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; 2004; Haughton, 2007). 
Following the collapse of communism, these countries defined the EU accession as 
their main foreign policy objective. By making such a choice, they undertook the 
commitment of meeting the democratic standards of the European Union and thus 
widely opened the domestic political space for EU influence. As put by Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier, “the desire of most CEECs [Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries – I. V.] to join the EU, combined with the high volume and intrusive-
ness of the rules attached to membership, allow the EU an unprecedented influence 
in restructuring domestic institutions and the entire range of public policies in the 
CEECs” (2005: 1). 
The relationship of “asymmetric interdependence” between the credible mem-
ber states and the EU was created as a result whereby the latter’s democratizing influ-
ence was twofold (Vachudova, 2005: 63). During the early stage of these countries’ 
accession, the EU had an impact on them by presenting the political and economic 
benefits of membership as well as the costs of exclusion (ibid.). Subsequently, the 
EU’s influence took a form of “active leverage” through an insistence on the fulfill-
ment of the Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the Acquis communautaire as 
conditions sine qua non for membership (ibid.: 105). As stated by Vachudova, “the 
enormous benefits and demanding requirements of EU membership created condi-
tions for the substantial influence of an international institution on the domestic poli-
cy choices of aspiring member states” (2002: 2). The attitude of their political elites 
toward the process of European integration, motivated by their resolute ambition to 
join the EU, was therefore determined by the ensuing leverage from Brussels.
Similarly, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier identify two different stages of the 
accession of the East/Central European states to the EU (2005: 210). Initiated by 
the onset of the post-communist transition, the first was characterized by the EU’s 
strategy of “democratic conditionality” aimed at inducing these states to comply 
with its principles of legitimate statehood (2003: 496). Throughout this period, the 
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EU insisted on the adoption of the general rules of liberal democracy as the basic 
requirement for membership. The basic method employed with this goal was “rein-
forcement by reward” whereby the EU “reacts to the fulfillment or non-fulfillment 
of its conditions by granting and withholding rewards but does not engage in co-
ercion or large-scale support of non-compliant states” (ibid.). Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier argue that political elites of the states influenced by the EU decided 
whether to comply with its democratic criteria depending on the domestic political 
cost of their adoption. During the later stage of the integration process, the EU’s 
leverage mainly related to “the content of legislation that the CEECs had to adopt 
as preconditions for membership” (2005: 211). The level of adoption of the Acquis 
norms increased dramatically as the EU made them “subject of its conditionality”, 
which demonstrates the domestic impact of the Union and, in particular, the causal 
link between European integration of these countries and the positioning of their 
political elites on this process. 
3. Montenegro: the Puzzle of Party Consensus on the EU
I hold that neither of the two previously elaborated approaches to the issue of party 
competition on the issue of European integration can be applied to the recent politi-
cal experience of Montenegro. Instead, taking into account the specific character of 
the country’s post-communist transition, I contend that one needs to shed light on 
the critical junctures of this process – shaping the structure of political life and de-
fining the route of its future political development – in order to understand the logic 
of party positioning vis-à-vis European integration.
I focus on the following party organizations in Montenegro: the Democratic 
Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista – DPS), the Socialist People’s 
Party (Socijalistička narodna partija – SNP), the New Serb Democracy (Nova srp-
ska demokratija – NSD), the Movement for Changes (Pokret za promjene – PZP), 
and Positive Montenegro (Pozitivna Crna Gora – PCG). As demonstrated by the 
results of the parliamentary elections held in this period, the five parties have domi-
nated Montenegro’s political life subsequent to the renewal of its state indepen-
dence. The DPS-led coalition won the September 2006 elections, securing 41 (out 
of 81) seats, the NSD-led coalition won 12, while the SNP and the first-time run-
ning PZP garnered 11 each. In March 2009, the governing coalition won 48 seats 
against the SNP’s 16, the NSD’s eight, and the PZP’s five. The results of the last 
parliamentary elections, organized in October 2012, were as follows: the DPS-led 
coalition – 39 seats, the NSD-PZP coalition – 20, the SNP – nine, and the newly es-
tablished PCG – seven. Thus, in each of the three Parliament convocations in inde-
pendent Montenegro, these parties have individually or in coalitions secured more 
than 90 per cent of the mandates, which is why I consider them a representative 
sample for the present study. 
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3.1. Parties on European Integration 
During the process of European integration, each East/Central European state went 
through a period of fierce party contestation over this issue. While a vast majority 
of parties in these countries endorsed their EU accession, there were still some im-
portant political organizations opposing the process. What is more, as the negotia-
tion process advanced, the level of Euro skepticism, as well as the intensity of the 
political debate in candidate countries grew steadily (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). 
In contrast, political parties in Montenegro wholeheartedly and without an excep-
tion support the country’s European integration. At the same time, it is their mutu-
ally disputed capacity to contribute to this process that is at the core of the European 
debate in this country. In other words, political competition is about “the parties’ 
modus operandi rather than over substantive programmatic alternatives and ideo-
logical commitments” (Grzymala-Busse and Innes, 2003: 67).
The Democratic Party of Socialists has been the ruling party in Montenegro 
since the 1990 introduction of multi-party competition and is the leading political 
force in the process of its state revival and the accession to the European Union. 
The DPS’s program defines the country’s membership in the EU as “the key politi-
cal goal”.6 Accordingly, DPS-led governments have initiated and been in charge of 
Montenegro’s European integration process.7 The opposition parties strongly sup-
port the country’s political course as well, while questioning the DPS’s willingness 
to implement democratic reforms linked to the EU integration process. “Montene-
gro as a full-fledged member of the European family” is one of the basic principles 
in the program of the Socialist People’s Party.8 Currently in the coalition named 
“The Democratic Front” (Demokratski front), the New Serb Democracy and the 
Movement for Changes are also pro-EU oriented. As emphasized in the party pro-
gram, the NSD is “dedicated to the membership of Montenegro in the European 
Union”.9 Similarly, the PZP’s manifesto states at the very beginning that “the activi-
ties of the party are informed by democratic principles and undertaken within the 
6 Available (in Montenegrin only) at: http://www.dps.me/images/DPS/docs/program%20priorite-
ta%20%20-%20dps%20jun%202015.pdf. 
7 Montenegro signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in 
October 2007. The country was granted candidate status in December 2010 whereas the official 
accession negotiation process with the EU was launched in June 2012. To date, Montenegro 
has opened 22 and provisionally closed two negotiation chapters. For more detailed informa-
tion on the country’s EU accession process, see: http://www.delmne.ec.europa.eu/code/navigate.
php?Id=56.
8 The program (in Serbian) is available at: http://www.snp.co.me/strana.asp?kat=1&id=4085. 
9 The text (in Cyrillic) is available at: http://www.nova.org.me/node/20. 
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framework of the European integrations”.10 The document appeals to those Monte-
negrin citizens “who desire to live in a stable society based on the respect for laws, 
and who envisage Montenegro as economically prosperous and socially responsible 
state with full membership in the European Union”. Likewise, the program of Posi-
tive Montenegro recognizes “the accession and full membership in the EU” as “the 
main priority of Montenegro”.11
In a nutshell, both governmental and opposition parties in Montenegro strongly 
favor the country’s European integration. Yet, their unanimity in this regard might 
seem surprising considering deep political cleavages dividing them, in particular 
the one that relates to the question of Montenegro’s statehood. As explained in the 
following sections of this article, the DPS led the political movement that advocat-
ed the restoration of the country’s independence. In contrast, the SNP and the Serb 
People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka – SNS) played key roles in the rival politi-
cal camp endorsing the maintenance of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
(Državna zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora – SCG). At that time operating as a political 
NGO, the PZP took a neutral stance in the referendum process. Finally, the strongly 
pro-independence Positive Montenegro was established only in 2012 and hence did 
not partake in the referendum campaign. 
3.2. The Determinants of Party Positioning on European Integration
As mentioned in the previous section, a majority of scholars analyzing the issue of 
party positioning on the issue of European integration suggest that a party’s attitude 
in this regard is for the most part conditioned by its ideological profile. Moreover, 
they demonstrated that in both Western and East/Central European countries the 
opposition to the integration process was derived from two ideological sources – 
the radical Left (economic dimension) and radical TAN (cultural dimension). In 
the West, however, these values were found to be upheld by parties at the opposite 
political poles, whereas in the European post-communist states party organizations 
tend to combine them in their political programs. Although the underlying logic of 
party positioning on the issue of European integration is the same in the two re-
gions, the way in which this process interacts with their axes of political competi-
tion substantially differs. 
In Montenegro, nonetheless, the same logic cannot be used to explain the (lack 
of) party competition on the issue of European integration. According to the model 
outlined above, political parties located in the right pole of the economic dimension 
10 Available at: http://www.promjene.org/images/documents/Programe_MFC.pdf. 
11 See the document (in Montenegrin) at: http://www.pozitivnacrnagora.me/images/dokumenta/
ProgramPozitivneCrneGore.pdf.
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tend to support this process. Given that the leading Montenegrin parties are all 
pro-EU oriented, we would therefore expect them to take the position of economic 
Right, which however is not the case. In fact, only two – the New Serb Democracy 
and the Movement for Changes – out of the five observed parties might, based on 
their economic policies, be considered right wing parties. The NSD’s vision of eco-
nomic development thus envisages “the affirmation of tax politics that would allow 
for new investments and imply entrepreneurial creativity”.12
Similarly, the PZP’s program clearly emphasizes the party’s liberal economic 
orientation:
The market relations in Montenegro should be governed by the principle of com-
petitiveness. The principle of regulatory action should be introduced only when 
absolutely necessary to protect the interests of the state and the citizens and pre-
vent the formation of monopolies and cartels.13
In contrast to these parties, the Socialist People’s Party upholds leftist eco-
nomic beliefs. Clearly prioritizing economic equality over economic freedom, the 
SNP promotes the welfare state concept based on the government’s regulation and 
redistribution policies. As stated in the party program, the SNP “advocates a strong 
social function of the state which has to be the guarantee of freedom and social se-
curity for all the citizens, regardless of their individual abilities”.14 Albeit positioned 
closer to the ideological center than the SNP, Positive Montenegro also promotes 
leftist economic beliefs. Recognizing Norway and Sweden as economic role-mo-
dels, the party program advocates “socially responsible economic policies” and 
calls upon the state to “assume the role of active economic manager, reject the cur-
rently ruling economic theory, and accept the imperfections of self-regulated mar-
ket economy”.15
Finally, whereas the four opposition parties’ programs undoubtedly speak for 
their economic policies, the ideological position of the Democratic Party of Social-
12 See footnote 9. The party’s economic orientation was more clearly articulated in the earlier 
program of the then Serb People’s Party: “The SNS advocates the greatest possible internal and 
foreign trade liberalization of Montenegrin economy as precondition for the creation of compe-
tition that will raise the quality and lower the prices for the consumers[.] The fundamental role 
of the state in the economy is not to trade, sell, lease out and to incur debt, but to legally protect 
property, free commerce, contracting and the trade of property rights – first and foremost from 
itself and then from every form of encroachment – and to compensate its expenses by a reason-
able taxation” (once available at: www.sns.co.me/program.php, the SNS’s program is no longer 
available on line).
13 See footnote 10.
14 See footnote 8. 
15 See footnote 11.
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ists with regards to the economy is difficult to locate. On the one hand, the party’s 
name and membership in the Socialist International imply a left-wing character of 
its economic agenda. On the other hand, economic priorities listed in the DPS’s pro-
gram as well as the economic policies of the DPS-led governments make a rather 
different impression. The party thus advocates the creation of “an economic system 
free of constraints” and “conducive to the development of a new entrepreneurial 
system of values and an inflow of foreign direct investments”, private-state part-
nership in education, health and other traditionally state-managed sectors, and “de-
regulation and an increase in the competence and efficiency of the public admini-
stration system”.16 At the same time, pro-business policies including significant tax 
cuts,17 the gradual establishment of a free-trade zone in Montenegro, intensive pri-
vatization (including the entire banking system, state telecommunications compa-
ny, etc.), and the liberalization of the health, social security and pension systems, 
are at the core of the incumbent government’s economic agenda. For these reasons, 
despite the party label, we categorize the DPS as a center-right political organiza-
tion.
Furthermore, the Montenegrin experience of party positioning on European 
integration seems to challenge the generalizability of the aforementioned domestic 
political competition model when it comes to the second, cultural dimension too. As 
previously mentioned, across Europe, parties located at the TAN ideological pole 
tend to be Eurosceptic. In Montenegro, nonetheless, we find a party – the New Serb 
Democracy – which, albeit clearly TAN-oriented, supports the EU integration pro-
cess. The NSD’s program puts an emphasis on the “protection and development of 
Serb national identity in Montenegro”, advocates a “national upbringing and spiri-
tual revival of our people”, insists on “an important place in these processes of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church”, etc. Unlike the NSD, the other four parties under obser-
vation follow the GAL ideological principles such as equal rights (human, social, 
political, economic, and cultural) for all the citizens of Montenegro regardless of 
their nationality and religion, gender equality, environmental protection, and sus-
tainable development.
Finally, the EU political leverage – regarded by a number of scholars as the 
key determinant of political elites’ attitudes in post-communist states toward the 
process of European integration – is also insufficient in determining an explanation 
in the case of Montenegro. In the Milošević-dominated state federation with Ser-
bia, Montenegro, as thoroughly elaborated in the following sections, remained po-
litically subjugated, internationally isolated and as such too far from the European 
16 See footnote 6. 
17 As a result, Montenegro has the lowest corporate tax rate (9 per cent) in Europe, and one of 
the lowest personal income (12 per cent) and value added taxes (19 per cent).
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Union to be significantly influenced by its political leverage (Vuković, 2010: 60). 
At the same time, the basic structure of the Montenegrin multi-party political sys-
tem, including the pro-EU attitude of the political elite and the aforementioned par-
ty consensus on European integration, were created during this period. By the time 
the European Union officially entered independent Montenegro’s political scene in 
June 2006,18 it had already taken its current form. 
To understand the process of its formation and, in particular, the attitude of its 
main constituents in regards to the EU accession issue, one therefore needs to look 
at Montenegro’s political development prior to the referendum on independence. I 
identify and analyze in the remainder of the article three main stages of this process 
– hybrid regime (1990-1997), democratic transition (1997-2001), and independ-
ence debate (2001-2006). The outcome of the political conflicts dominating these 
periods in Montenegro’s post-communist transition brought about its democratiza-
tion, the restoration of its independence and – with the support of the main political 
parties – the beginning of its accession to the European Union. 
3.2.1. Hybrid Regime in Montenegro
Contrary to the political experiences of most states in East/Central Europe, the col-
lapse of the communist regime in Montenegro was not caused by bottom-up de-
mocratizing pressures. Instead, the regime change process started with a transfer of 
political power within the structures of the country’s then only party organization. 
While those representing the political system altered, the system itself was left in-
tact. Although it led to the formal creation of a pluralist political arrangement in 
mid-1990,19 this political change did not bring about a genuine discontinuity with 
the ancien regime. With the new leadership and under the original party label, the 
League of Communists of Montenegro (Savez komunista Crne Gore – SKCG) – a 
year later renamed the Democratic Party of Socialists – won a convincing triumph 
in the country’s first multi-party elections, held in December 1990. The SKCG 
got an impressive 52.6 per cent of the vote, thus securing 83/125 parliamentary 
18 On 12 June, in the wake of the renewal of Montenegro’s independence in the 21 May 2006 
referendum, the EU Council concluded that “the European Union and its Member States have 
decided that they will develop further their relations with the Republic of Montenegro as a sove-
reign, independent State” (decision available at: http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_6031_
en.htm). 
19 The new bill on political association was passed by the Montenegrin Parliament on 11 July 
1990. A few weeks later, the Parliament adopted the amendments (nos. 64 to 82) to the Constitu-
tion of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro, abolishing the existing delegate model of represen-
tation and allowing for direct multi-party parliamentary elections (Vuković, 2014: 197). 
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seats.20 To complete the great political success, the SKCG’s candidate and the par-
ty head, Momir Bulatović, won the concomitantly organized presidential elections 
(Vuković, 2014: 200).21
With the power mechanisms inherited from the one-party system, the DPS 
remained the predominant political force in Montenegro until 1997. As noted by 
Darmanović, the ruling party used the hyper-privileged political position to render 
the opposition politically uncompetitive:
The DPS held the system together by assiduously using its complete control over 
state organs and resources in order to squelch critics and rivals and win elections. 
The usual range of methods was employed, including party domination of the sta-
te-owned media; the packing of offices with party favorites; the maintenance of 
slush funds; occasional intimidation of adversaries; the abuse of police authority 
to influence the electoral process; and manipulations of the electoral system. Bac-
ked by these kinds of tactics, the DPS easily bested its dispirited opponents and 
retained an absolute majority of seats in the Montenegrin parliament (2003: 147).
Notwithstanding the 1990 formal democratic reforms, the nature of Montene-
gro’s political system remained predominantly authoritarian. In the early phase of 
transition from non-democratic rule, the country thus witnessed the creation of a 
text-book example of a hybrid (semi-authoritarian) political regime (Levitsky and 
Way, 2010). Due to the incumbent party’s monopoly of power, both de jure and de 
facto, the conditions for political competition in Montenegro were “hardly free and 
fair” during this period (Bieber, 2003: 16). The SKCG/DPS simply did not act as 
one of a number of equal participants in the multi-party contest, but much more like 
“a state party using all the advantages brought about by a total control over the state 
apparatus and resources” (Darmanović, 2007: 156). 
In the early elections held in December 1992, in the face of the exceptionally 
bad political and economic results of its two-year rule,22 the Democratic Party of 
Socialists succeeded in garnering enough votes (42.7 per cent) to stay in power 
(46/85 seats). The DPS thus became the only party in the South-East European 
post-communist countries that managed to maintain an absolute parliament major-
ity after the second election (Goati, 2001: 132). At the same time, the party leader, 
20 Among the parties that triumphed in the initial multi-party elections in the republics of social-
ist Yugoslavia, the SKCG’s result was by far the best. See more in: Vuković (2010). 
21 Bulatović garnered 76.1 per cent of the vote in the second election round.
22 In the years that followed the DPS’s 1990 electoral triumph, the socialist Yugoslavia collapsed 
and the new state federation with Serbia – named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – was cre-
ated and almost instantaneously put under the international sanctions. Montenegro’s industrial 
output dropped as a consequence by more than 30 per cent, while the unemployment rate rose to 
23.6 per cent (Djurić, 2003: 140). 
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Bulatović, won the second presidential term.23 Furthermore, in the November 1996 
elections, the incumbent party scored another victory despite the further aggrava-
tion of the socio-economic situation in Montenegro.24 Moreover, albeit challenged 
by a coalition of the two biggest opposition parties – the Liberal Alliance of Monte-
negro (Liberalni savez Crne Gore – LSCG) and the People’s Party (Narodna stran-
ka – NS) – that, notwithstanding completely different political views,25 formed an 
alliance due to each party’s individual inability to even threaten the ruling party’s 
political hegemony,26 the DPS won not only an absolute majority of seats (45/71) 
but this time even an absolute majority of the vote (51.2 per cent).27 Among the ex-
communist parties in the wider region, its electoral performance was once again 
unmatched (ibid.: 137).
3.2.2. Montenegro’s Democratic Transition
The non-democratic rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists followed by the 
opposition’s inability to politically restrict it marked the first phase of Montene-
gro’s post-communist transition. Still, the country’s further political development 
was determined not by this political conflict but by the one within the ruling party 
(Vuković, 2010: 63). In 1997, merely a few months after the above mentioned land-
slide electoral triumph, the DPS formally split up as a consequence of an internal 
disagreement between the two most powerful party members – president Bulatović 
23 Bulatović won 63.3 per cent of the vote in the second electoral round. 
24 In 1995, the country’s GDP stood at 50.2 per cent, whereas its industrial output was only 41.1 
per cent of the 1990 level (Djurić, 2003: 140).
25 The progressive, pro-European LSCG was the party that politically established the idea of re-
newal of Montenegrin independence, whereas the conservative NS stood at the position of Serb 
nationalism, thereby vehemently advocating the transformation of the Serb-Montenegrin federa-
tion into a unitary state (Vuković, 2015: 78).
26 Interestingly, compared to their individual performances four years earlier, the two parties 
jointly made a worse electoral result. In 1992, they got 27 (NS – 14 and LSCG – 13 respectively) 
out of 85 mandates (32 per cent), whereas in the 1996 elections, their ‘People’s Concord’ (Narod-
na sloga) coalition won 19 out of 71 seats (27 per cent) (ibid.). 
27 Using the uncompromised monopoly of power, the DPS was able to conduct an extremely 
lavish campaign for the 1996 elections, “this time beating the opposition in terms of money spent 
by a margin of 10:1” (Bieber, 2003: 28). Besides, the ruling Montenegrin party was in a position 
to unilaterally change the electoral rules so as to maximize the prospects of political triumph. 
The new electoral law introduced 14 electoral districts at the national level. Previously, the entire 
country represented a single electoral district. Hence, as mentioned above, the DPS got 51.2 per 
cent of the vote and as much as 63.4 per cent of seats. At the same time, even though the electoral 
census stood at 5 per cent, the opposition Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija – 
SDP) – despite winning 5.7 per cent of the vote – did not get into the parliament because of the 
district organization.
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and vice-president Milo Djukanović. Their conflict over the issue of political part-
nership with the Serbian political establishment led to the end of the regime which 
they had successfully built together (Vuković, 2015: 79). From that moment on, 
“the political game in Montenegro changed completely” (Darmanović, 2003: 148). 
The key to understanding the reasons behind the breakup of the long predomi-
nant Democratic Party of Socialists is the party’s political relationship with Slo-
bodan Milošević. The Serbian strongman made a decisive political contribution to 
the aforementioned 1989 leadership turnover in the Montenegro’s League of Com-
munists. As a result, he got a reliable political partner for the project of reorganiz-
ing the Yugoslav socialist federation in line with the Serbian national interests. The 
close political cooperation continued throughout the years to come, notwithstand-
ing the tragic consequences of Milošević’s political ambition which soon became 
strikingly obvious. In the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia, Montenegrin politi-
cal officials thus estimated that it was in their state’s best interest to continue living 
with Serbia within a single political entity. In the referendum organized on 1 March 
1992, their initiative was given an overwhelming popular support.28 Less than a 
month later, the new Serb-Montenegrin federation was placed under severe UN Se-
curity Council’s sanctions owing to the Serbian government’s involvement in the 
armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Considering the absolute political domination of the Democratic Party of So-
cialists in Montenegro, it was clear that the country would not move out of the 
stalled transition and international isolation as long as the ruling party was on the 
pro-Milošević political course. Arguably in view of that, Milo Djukanović, Monte-
negro’s Prime Minister and DPS vice-president decided to turn his back to the old 
political ally and instead look for new ones in the West. His occasional and, as a 
rule, relatively moderate criticism of Belgrade’s politics evolved during 1996 into 
an open confrontation with its main protagonist.29 The final act of Djukanović’s po-
litical transformation, formulated in an interview in which he dismissed Milošević 
as “a man with obsolete political beliefs”, took place at the beginning of the next 
year.30
Unlike the Prime Minister, President Bulatović remained loyal to the Serbi-
an counterpart, which made a conflict between the two most influential figures in 
28 The total of 62 per cent of Montenegrin voters (96.65 per cent of the vote cast) agreed to stay 
in a state federation with Serbia. 
29 Djukanović thus supported the massive anti-Milošević protests of the Serbian political oppo-
sition and civic associations organized in November 1996 due to the Serbian authorities’ refusal 
to acknowledge the defeat in the local elections.
30 The interview given to the Serbian weekly Vreme in February 1997 is available at: http://www.
tol.org/client/article/17621-interview-milo-djukanovic-milosevic-is-an-obsolete-politician.html. 
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Montenegrin politics unavoidable. As mentioned above, the formal split within the 
leadership of the Democratic Party of Socialists happened only months after anoth-
er demonstration of its absolute political dominance. By the will of a majority of the 
DPS’s Main Board members,31 Djukanović came out of the conflict as the winner 
leaving Bulatović no choice but to leave the party. Followed by a significant num-
ber of DPS representatives, the former party president soon established a new po-
litical organization – the Socialist People’s Party. Thus losing a great deal of politi-
cal influence at both the state and local level, the DPS, albeit still in power, was no 
longer in the hyper-privileged position relative to political competitors (Vuković, 
2014: 217). This was the critical moment of Montenegro’s post-communist political 
development as “the second transition was beginning and dominant-party politics 
were on their way out” (Darmanović, 2003: 148). What is more, the division within 
the DPS set in motion the process of redefining Montenegrin national identity by 
making a clear – and, by many, previously questioned – distinction between those 
in Montenegro who declared themselves as Montenegrins and those who declared 
themselves as Serbs (Dzankic, 2013; Jenne and Bieber, 2014; Vuković, 2015). 
The October 1997 presidential elections were an undeniable indicator of the poli-
tical change underway in Montenegro. After Bulatović narrowly won the first round 
(47.44 to 46.71 per cent), Djukanović triumphed in the second by less than 5,500 
votes (out of 344,000 cast). In addition, a month before the vote, the “Agreement 
on the Minimum Principles for the Development of a Democratic Infrastructure in 
Montenegro” (Dogovor o minimumu principa za razvoj demokratske infrastruk-
ture u Crnoj Gori) – with “free and fair elections” as one of the key elements – was 
signed by the leaders of all parties represented in the Parliament. This marked the 
official beginning of a new age of Montenegro’s political development and “some-
thing like a set of roundtable negotiations held seven years late” (ibid.: 149). At the 
same time, widely acclaimed by the international community, the 1997 electoral tri-
umph of a reform-oriented presidential candidate was also Milošević’s first political 
setback in Montenegro since 1989.32
With the absolute victory of the DPS-led coalition (48.9 per cent of the vote; 45 
out of 73 seats) in the October 1998 parliamentary elections, the country’s first in-
31 At the meeting held on 11 July 1997, 62 out of 99 members of the party’s highest body stood 
by Djukanović (Vuković, 2014: 217).
32 In this regard, a symbolic connotation of the violent riots in Podgorica on the night of 13-14 
January 1998 on the occasion of which the followers of the outgoing president, unwilling to ac-
cept the electoral result, attacked the Government building, and, on the other hand, the presence 
of the ambassadors of the United States and the European Union member states at the inaugura-
tion of the new one, two days later, was exceptionally strong (Vuković, 2010: 64).
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ternationally observed, free and fair balloting,33 the ruling party made another major 
step on the new political course. At the same time, it became clear that Milošević 
had irreversibly lost political control over Montenegro. In the following period, with 
open support from the U.S. and the most important European countries,34 the pro-
democratic Montenegrin leadership began taking over function after function from 
the federal state level (Vuković, 2010: 65).35 The government’s political credibility 
and pro-Western orientation got a powerful confirmation during the 1999 NATO 
campaign against the Yugoslav federation when it managed to keep Montenegro 
neutral in the face of strong pressures from Milošević and the opposition parties 
loyal to him (including the SNP and the Serb People’s Party out of which the NSD 
was later created), both of which intended to drag the state into the armed conflict.
With Milošević’s removal from power a year later, Montenegro was finally 
free from a major security threat. Yet, even with a new democratic government in 
Belgrade, the problem of the two disproportionately sized states’ federation func-
tioning remained. Subsequent to the 1998 parliamentary elections, Montenegrin 
authorities had, as mentioned above, considerably expanded the scope of the Re-
public’s powers. At the same time, their enthusiasm for the joint political life with 
Serbia was seriously – and, as it turned out, irreparably – damaged after the years 
of Milošević’s disastrous rule. Arguably due to the same reason, for the first time 
since the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, a majority of Montenegrin citizens 
were expressing support for state independence.36 Now that the political struggle of 
Djukanović’s pro-Western government against the former Serbian/Yugoslav presi-
dent and his Montenegrin political followers came to a conclusion, the statehood 
issue emerged as a new line of political division in this country (ibid.: 66). 
3.2.3. Independence Debate in Montenegro
Before the 1997 conflict in the Democratic Party of Socialists, the prospects for 
any political success of the idea of Montenegro’s independence were extremely un-
likely. In the 1992 parliamentary elections, running on this political platform, the 
33 See the OSCE/ODIHR report at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro/15101?
download=true. In this regard, it is also very important to mention that the biggest opposition 
party in Montenegro, Bulatović’s SNP, officially accepted the result of the elections.
34 Measured per capita, the direct U.S. financial aid to Montenegro during this period was ex-
ceeded only by the American support to the state of Israel (Darmanović, 2003).
35 As a part of this process, subsequent to the takeover of the taxation system and foreign trade, 
Djukanović’s administration decided in November 1999 to change the official currency from the 
Yugoslav Dinar to the Deutschmark (ibid.).
36 For the opinion polls on this particular issue, see: http://cedem.me/en/programmes/empirical-
research.html. 
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Liberal Alliance of Montenegro won only 13 out of 85 parliament seats. Four years 
later, as previously mentioned, the LSCG went on to form a pre-election coalition 
with the unionist People’s Party as a political alternative to DPS’s non-democrat-
ic governance. Under the conditions of the ruling party’s political hegemony, the 
statehood cleavage in Montenegro was indeed “of small political relevance” (Goati, 
2008: 297). Therefore, the Bulatović-Djukanović split symbolized a true moment 
of hope for pro-independence oriented Montenegrins. Moreover, the development 
of the political situation in the Yugoslav federation in the final years of Milošević’s 
rule was, as indicated above, “extremely favorable for the idea of Montenegro’s in-
dependence” (Vuković, 2010: 66).
However, the October 2000 Serbian democratic breakthrough completely 
changed the political circumstances in the country. With the formation of a new re-
formist government in Belgrade, Montenegro lost the status of the Western world’s 
“darling” in the Balkans. In addition, the international support for its leadership’s 
politics of gradual distancing from Serbia would soon be replaced with the concern 
for the region’s political stability. As noted in the International Crisis Group report 
on the Montenegrin referendum, “the EU worked very hard to counter, or at least 
postpone, any prospect of Montenegrin independence, which it felt would have a 
negative spillover effect in Kosovo and force a decision on its final status before 
the international community had a consensus on that question, and have a wider 
destabilizing effect in a still fragile region”.37 Accordingly, the EU’s representatives 
showed no enthusiasm for the initiative by Montenegro’s government launched in 
December 2001 with the aim of transforming the Yugoslav state federation into a 
confederation of two independent states.
Previously, in the parliamentary elections held on 22 April, the coalition of the 
Democratic Party of Socialists and the Social Democratic Party won a majority of 
seats (36 out of 77) on the promise of organizing a referendum on independence. 
They would soon form a minority government with the support of the traditionally 
pro-independence LSCG. A few months later, on the occasion of the DPS’s Fourth 
Congress, the party adopted a new program in which the renewal of the state sove-
reignty was defined as the key political goal. On the other hand, most opposition 
parties in Montenegro remained firmly on the course of state unity with Serbia. In 
the aforementioned elections, the SNP, the SNS, and the NS thus ran in a coalition 
named “Together for Yugoslavia”, winning 33 seats.
Apart from the clear line of division between supporters and opponents of 
Montenegro’s independence, the 2001 electoral contest also made visible a politi-
cal consensus on European integration in the country. In the new program, appro-
37 The full report is available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b042_monte-
negro_s_referendum.pdf.
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priately named “Along with Europe”, the DPS proclaimed the goal of “European 
integration of the Montenegrin state and society”.38 And while the ruling party thus 
merely formalized its post-1997 pro-European stance, its main opposition rival, the 
Socialist People’s Party, substantially altered the position on this particular issue 
right before the elections (Vuković, 2010: 68). At the Congress convened in Febru-
ary 2001, the party elected new leadership, replacing Bulatović and other officials 
loyal to Milošević. This came a few months after the SNP – Milošević’s most loyal 
political partner in Montenegro until his very last day in office – switched political 
sides and formed a coalition in the Yugoslav Parliament with the Serbian opposition 
parties.39 In addition, the 2001 Congress adopted a resolution expressing whole-
hearted support to the process of Montenegro’s European integration as an integral 
part of the federation with Serbia. 
A year later, the Serb People’s Party also witnessed a change of the conserva-
tive party leadership and a definite turn towards pro-EU rhetoric. Previously, stand-
ing on the positions of Serbian nationalism, the SNS supported Milošević’s “pa-
triotic” politics and, during the last two years of his rule, was represented in the 
federal Yugoslav government which he controlled. The SNP’s political shift thus 
marked the beginning of a new trend among the Montenegrin opposition parties as a 
part of which they “changed leaders and began expressing a newfound appreciation 
for Europe and the European rules of the game” (Darmanović, 2007: 156).
The next, early parliamentary elections in Montenegro were organized in Oc-
tober 2002. Previously, faced with the growing political pressure from the Euro-
pean Union whose officials strongly believed that Serbia and Montenegro together 
would advance faster towards full membership, the Montenegrin authorities were 
forced to postpone the organization of the promised referendum on independence. A 
compromise between the political ambitions of Montenegro and the EU was found 
in the creation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, initiated in March 
2002 and concluded a year later. Yet, at the insistence of the Montenegrin side, a 
“temporality clause” – guaranteeing the right of the SCG constituent members to 
hold a referendum on independence after three years – was built into the Union’s 
Constitutional Charter (Article 60).40 For the LSCG, its establishment was an act of 
38 See: http://www.dps.me/o-nama/istorijat. 
39 In return, SNP vice-president Zoran Žižić became the new Prime Minister of the Serb-Mon-
tenegrin state federation.
40 As stated in the Charter, “upon the expiry of a three-year period, member states shall have the 
right to initiate the proceedings for the change in its state status or for breaking away from the 
state union of Serbia and Montenegro[;] the decision on breaking away from the state union [...] 
shall be taken following a referendum[;] the law on referendum shall be passed [...] bearing in 
mind the internationally recognized democratic standards”. The full text is available at: http://
www.worldstatesmen.org/SerbMont_Const_2003.pdf. 
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treason against the national interests by the state leadership. Accordingly, the party 
decided to withdraw the support to the DPS-SDP government, which led Montene-
gro into the above said elections. 
Its outcome demonstrated that the Democratic Party of Socialists – now in coa-
lition with the Social Democratic Party – was still the country’s predominant politi-
cal force;41 that the lack of the EU’s understanding for the DPS’s key political goal 
– state independence – had no impact on the party’s strong pro-EU position;42 and 
that a solid majority of Montenegrin citizens were at that point pro-independence 
oriented (Vuković, 2010: 69).43 Four years later, on 21 May 2006, 55.5 per cent 
of those who took part in the referendum on Montenegro’s independence voted in 
favor of its renewal. The EU-monitored referendum campaign was, as mentioned 
above, fought between the two political blocs led by the DPS, on the one side, 
and by the SNP and SNS, on the other. The Movement for Changes, the country’s 
most influential political NGO (officially constituted as a party organization in July 
2006), did not actively participate in the referendum. The same goes for Positive 
Montenegro, founded six years later. 
Throughout the years that followed the 2006 plebiscite, the Democratic Party 
of Socialists has remained the dominant political force in Montenegro. Moreover, 
the statehood issue has continued to divide the country’s political scene as the main 
opposition parties proved reluctant to accept its independence in its full legal and 
political capacity.44 At the same time, the political consensus in Montenegro still 
exists only in relation to the necessity of its European integration.
4. Concluding Remarks
The analysis of the domestic political competition on European integration in Mon-
tenegro resembles the Moon observation – from a distance, its surface looks per-
fectly flat while actually hiding an interesting landscape of high mountains and 
lengthy craters. On the one hand, the most relevant political parties in this country 
41 The DPS-SDP electoral list secured an absolute majority of parliament seats (39 out of 75). 
42 Thus, the aforementioned list was appropriately named “For European Montenegro”. 
43 Taken together, political parties supporting the idea of Montenegrin state independence won 
45 seats.
44 Thus for instance, seven years after the 2007 adoption of Montenegro’s Constitution, the SNP 
and the New Serb Democracy (previously SNS) still demand a major revision of the articles in 
which the country’s symbols and the official language are defined. In addition to the Montene-
grin national flag, they insist on the introduction of the so-called “people’s” tricolor flag that 
would essentially replicate the national flag of Serbia. At the same time, they require that, along-
side Montenegrin, Serbian becomes the country’s second official language (ibid.). For more on 
the topic, see: Džankić (2015).
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unreservedly support the process of its accession to the EU. On the other hand, they 
are deeply divided even on the politically fundamental issue of Montenegro’s inde-
pendence. Departing from the general findings of the related literature, I sought to 
offer a plausible explanation of this political paradox.
I demonstrated that the party positioning on European integration in Monte-
negro took place in the period during which, due to its international isolation and 
the unresolved statehood question, the country’s political development remained 
largely unaffected by the EU’s political leverage. Accordingly, I showed that neither 
the ideological affiliation of the political parties in question nor the EU strategy of 
democratic conditionality in relation to the domestic political elite during the post-
communist transition could serve as guidelines for a better understanding of the 
Montenegrin party consensus on European integration. Instead, I presented some 
evidence indicating that, with an exception of the latecomers Movement for Chan-
ges and Positive Montenegro, the observed parties’ political shift towards Brussels 
was first and foremost meant to demonstrate their political shift away from Bel-
grade, i.e. from their shady political past marked by the tacit support of Milošević’s 
disreputable reign. 
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